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Summary
:
The issue of whether accounting should be regulated by government
has heretofore not been debated in the context of free speech as
guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution. This oversight
needs to be corrected in considering Constitutional limitations on the
government's power to regulate commerce. This article poses the issue
of trade-offs between these provisions of the Constitution in relation
to accounting; traces the emergence of corporation rights under the
Constitution; emphasizes the neglect of First Amendment arguments when
the SEC was created; surveys relevant court cases and summarizes the
prospect for First Amendment coverage of financial accounting.

IS ACCOUNTING REGULATION UNCONSTITUTIONAL ?
"Congress shall have power to... regulate Conimerce "
—U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 8.
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech...."
—U.S. Constitution, First Amendment.
The Accounting Establishment , a report by the U.S. Senate subcom-
mittee on Reports, Accounting and Management, was published in January,
1977. Later that year, Benston asked (although not in a context of
discussing the First Amendment), "Why is it a government function to
standardize data or require that corporations produce standardized
data?" [p. 46] Auditing firms reacted negatively to the report's 16
recommendations that would greatly extend the control by government
over the accounting profession. In its newsletter to clients, one
firm argued:
"Government should no more set accounting standards
^ than they (sic) should specify the editorial stan-
dards of the New York Times ." [Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
& Co.
,
p. 5]
If that analogy is accepted, then this further warning and appeal
to the First Amendment should also be accepted:
"A private association acting in consort with govern-
ment should no more regulate accounting standards
than they should specify the form and content of news
disclosures.
"
Justice William 0. Douglas once wrote, "...regulatory measures...
no matter how sophisticated, cannot be employed in purpose or in effect
to stifle, penalize, or curb the exercise of First Amendment Rights."
[Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 1961]
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However, regulation of corporate financial accounting data state-
ments and systems (hereafter FADS) is a fact of life in the United
States, Government and private agencies share control of form, content,
time, and circumstances of FADS. Regulators specify which accounting
statements must or must not be made available to the public, what data
those statements must or must not contain, what form those statements
must or must not take, when they must be published, and what internal
control systems must support the statements.
Debate over FADS regulations has been directed mainly to the
details of particular standards and to the efficiency and effective-
ness of government regulation compared to other means of achieving
(someones "social") objectives. Arguments have posed horrors of "big
business" against those of "big government," and allegations of "mar-
ket failure" against those of "government inefficiency." Much of the
debate has been over which organization, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) or some non-governmental association such as the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) should be the primary re-
gulator. Implicit in all the discussions on regulating FADS has been
the assumption that government and/or non-government organizations
validly possess and validly exercise authority to control the flow of
financial informatin ancillary to regulating coimnerce.
Government authority to regulate the acts and interactions of
persons and associations is not absolute in the United States. It
is limited by the Constitution which identifies certain acts as
"inalienable rights"—that is, individual behavior outside the reach
•^
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of government regulators who may not enhance their power at the
expense of certain individual freedoms. The scope of Constitutionally
valid government power over the FADS is not clearly understood, and
therefore it should not be presumed to exist absolutely. The assump-
tion that either SEC or FASB validly regulate FADS may be false.
The purpose of this paper is to examine some aspects of the Con-
stitutional legitimacy of government authority to regulate corporate
FADS. The procedure is to analyze and interpret legal case decisions
2in which relevant issues were discussed. Such an approach is war-
ranted because court decisions establish the boundaries within which,
under the Constitution, the government may act, and beyond which,
under the Constitution, private rights prevail. To our knowledge the
issue of regulating FADS has not previously been explored in the light
of Constitutional limitations on government behavior that constrains
or limits freedom under the First Amendment. This issue was expli-
citly raised first by Johnson [1979, pp. 13-14] as being more funda-
mental than either efficiency or equity arguments about FADS regula-
tions.
The second section comments on certain relations between the Con-
stitution and business corporations. The third section looks at the
creation of the SEC. The fourth section surveys court cases involving
First Amendment rights to freedom of speech. The fifth section exa-
mines corporate FADS in the light of the prior sections. The sixth
section summarizes the need for resolving the First Amendment issue
and takes a brief glimpse at the prospect for FADS being protected.
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II. The Constitution and Corporations
The Constitution of the United States does not speak for itself
even though its words have remained the same since 1787 (except as
modified by 16 amendments beyond the original Bill of Rights). It is
constantly subject to evolution by all three branches of the federal
government. Through formal amendment and legislation by Congress,
through judicial reinterpretation by the Courts, and through admini-
strative decision by Executive agencies, many innovations not antici-
pated by the 39 signatory Founding Fathers have been Constitutionalized.
Two such major innovations are giant regulatory government, and giant
business corporations.
Giant regulatory government has come about through Court reinter-
pretation, moving from a Constitution of limitations on government
power toward a Constitution of government power over persons and asso-
ciations. Certain legislative acts of Congress have, in effect, been
Constitutional changes far more significant than some of the formal
amendments. For example, the Sherman Anti-trust Act (1890), various
social and labor acts (around 1935), the Employment Act (1946) and the
Civil Rights Act (1964) are each the grounds for a different kind of
government than was created in 1787—even though Congress presumed to
act each time under express grants of authority in the Constitution.
The Supreme Court "approved" all these acts (except the Employment Act
which has not been litigated) on grounds that the Constitution gives
Congress power to regulate interstate commerce, and the power to tax
and spend for the general welfare.
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The Constitution was drafted with only two entities in mind: in-
dependent natural persons, and the government. [Hamilton and Madison,
1788; and Ostrom, 1971] The Constitution does not talk about voluntary-
associations such as political parties, professional and labor unions,
philanthropic foundations, and business corporations. However, as
Tocqueville observed "An association for political, commercial or manu-
facturing . . . science and literature ... by defending its own
rights against the enroachments of government, saves the common liber-
ties of the country." [Vol. II, p. 342] The reality today of large
associations having economic, political and social as well as legal
dimensions has been so much recognized that one scholar asserts that
the Preamble to the Constitution should read, "We, the groups . . ."
[Miller, p. 114]
Though the inalienable right of a person freely to choose to join
or not join an association is entirely different from the asserted
power of association leaders to coerce behavior of members and non-
members, it is often said that "the basic unit of society has become
—
whatever it may have been in 1787—the pluralistic group." [Miller,
p. 114] (For a counter argument, see Ostrom, 1971.) While the right
of association is grounded in English common law, and "incorporated
with the manners and customs of the people" [Tocqueville, Vol. I, p.
201] the Supreme Court did not read a right of association into the
Constitution until 1958. [NAACP v. Alabama]
The corporation became an artificial "juristic" person in 1819
[Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward] and a Constitutional person
by unanimous Supreme Court fiat in 1886 [Santa Clara County v. Southern
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Pacific Railway]. Though minority opinion challenge to "corporate
personality" was unsuccessful in 1938 [Connecticut Life Insurance Co.
V. Johnson] and again in 1941 [Wheeling Steel Corporation v. Glander]
,
the Supreme Court has twice interpreted First Amendment rights of human
persons as prior to rights of corporations to exclude persons from real
estate [March v. Alabama, 1946; and Amalgamated Food Employees Union
V. Logan Valley Plaza, 1968]. While Corporations have enjoyed Consti-
tutional protection of property since 1889 [Minneapolis and St. Louis
Railway v. Beckwith] , they have never gained protection of "life" and
"liberty" to the extent that hxjman persons enjoy under the Constitution.
(The full question of how far Corporations should be able to claim
Constitutional protection is beyond the scope of this paper. For a
review of some of those issues, including the interpretation that cor-
porations are not citizens, see the dissenting opinion of Justice
William 0. Douglas and Hugo Black in Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander,
1949). In 1978 Corporations were given First Amendment protection
against abridgement of "political" speech and publication [First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 1978].
We acknowledge that in the past the Court has distinguished
between "religious," "political," "commercial," and "cultural" speech.
[Countryman, 1977, pp. 43-45]. But we also acknowledge that in a more
fundamental analysis of First Amendment protection, such distinctions
may have been made arbitrarily. [Leibeler, pp. 42-44] . Our primary
concern here is for so-called "commercial" speech in relation to the
regulation of FADS.
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III. Creation of SEC
The Securities and Exchange Commission was created by Congress
in The Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Commission was formed to
replace the Federal Trade Commission in administering the Securities
Act of 1933, and to administer the Act of 19 34. The scope of its
authority to regulate FADS is extensive. The 1933 Act enables the
Commission to regulate the public disclosure associated with the ini-
tial offering of securities for public sale. The 1934 Act broadened
that authority to include the regulation of publicly available peri-
odic reports of firms whose securities are traded on national securi-
ties exchange and, by virtue of the 1964 Amendments, traded on over-
the-counter-markets. The Public Utilities Holding Companies act of
1935, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 extended the Commission's regulatory scope. Finally, the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 brought the internal information
systems used by firms under the Commission's purview.
Though many of the States had enacted "blue sky" laws, imposing
their regulations on securities markets operating within their jurisdic-
tion, the 1934 Act was an early effort of the Roosevelt administration
to bring securities markets under the direct control of the federal
government. The "New Dealers" justified this legislative measure as
an ethical imperative both (1) to impose a penalty on private business
because of its alleged inability to adapt its practices to those of a
changing economic system; and (2) to protect the public from a recur-
rence of the 1929 disaster, and private investors from "unscrupulous"
speculators and investment dealers. Senator Sam Rayburn said:
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The Fundamental fact behind this bill [H.R. 9323]
is that the leaders of private business ... have
not since the war been able to protect themselves
by compelling a continuous and orderly program of
changes of methods and standards of doing business
to match the degree to which the economic system
has been constantly changing The repeti-
tion in the summer of 1933 of the abuses of 1929
has convinced a patient public that enlightened
self-interest in private leadership is not suffi-
ciently powerful to effect the necessary changes
alone—that private leadership seeking to make
changes must be given government help and protec-
tion. [ Congressional Record
,
p. 7702, emphasis
added]
.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was designed to regulate the
activities of the national securities exchange. Its purpose was to
establish the basic rules governing trading. FADS were among those
items which it sought to regulate. Senator Rayburn said:
No investor, no speculator can safely buy and sell
securities upon the exchanges without having an
intelligent basis for forming his judgment as to
the value of the securities he buys or sells. The
idea of a free and open public market is built upon
the theory that competing judgments of buyers and
sellers as to the fair price of a security brings
about a situation where the market price reflects
as nearly as possible a just price. Just as arti-
ficial manipulation tends to upset the true function
of an open market, so the hiding and secreting of
important information obstruct the operations of
markets as indices of real value. There cannot be
honest markets without honest publicity. [ Congres-
sional Record
,
p. 7704, emphasis added]
.
Congress sought to provide for "honest publicity" in securities
markets through SEC authority to determine what FADS must be and/or
may not be made publicly available. Honesty was to be achieved by
making the disclosure or non-disclosure of certain FADS compulsory.
By its act. Congress in effect deemed that some FADS should become
state or common property rather than private property. [Refer to
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Section 13(a)(1) in conjunction with Section 12(b)(l)(K) of the 1934
Act] .
The 1934 Act was specifically designed to regulate FADS. It can
be viewed as interfering with the free flow of a particular class of
data on the ground that "a business that gathers its capital from the
investing public has not the same rights to secrecy as a small pri-
vately owned business" [Rayburn, Congressional Record
,
p. 7705]. Its
effect was to convey to an agency of the government, "in the public
interest," the power to determine what may or may not be reported in
the published, publicly available, financial accounting statements of
those firms whose securities are nationally traded. It required that
the SEC act "in the public interest." Rayburn said:
We want to lodge authority, power, and direction
somewhere in some agency of the government as
representing the people of the country, with the
rights to approve or disapprove the rules and
regulations of the exchanges, and with the power
^ and authority to enforce the rules and regulations
if in the public interest it is found necessary .
[Congressional Record, p. 7696, emphasis added.]
But, the Act did not define either "public interest" or "neces-
sary." It did not provide the SEC with any standards to guide its
attempts to identify that interest. In effect, the appointed Com-
missioners were left free to decide what is and is not "in public
interest," subject to an ambiguous "over-sight" by Congress.
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 met with significant
opposition both in the public hearings, conducted by the Senate
Banking and Currency committee, and in the House and Senate debates
which preceded its enactment. Opponents based their criticisms on
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the potential effects of the measure on small business and on small
businessmen. [ Congressional Record
,
pp. 7710-11] It was pointed out
that the national exchanges—the New York Stock Exchange, in parti-
cular—had already established disclosure requirements exceeding
those provided for by the Act. [ Congressional Record
,
p. 7698] Con-
cern was expressed with regard to the broad powers being granted to
the SEC without the provision of standards to control their use.
[ Congressional Record , pp. 8272-8275]
.
The Constitutionality of the Act was questioned only in respect
to the Tenth Amendment which states, "The Powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States
are reserved to the States respectively and to the people. " On behalf
of the New York Stock Exchange, Thomas B. Gay argued both in his tes-
timony and in a brief presented to the Senate Banking and Currency
Committee [Hearings , Part 15, pp. 6586-6600 and 6647-56] that securi-
ties transactions were activities conducted within the jurisdiction of
the powers of the States because corporations receive their charters
from the states. He argued further that securities transactions were
classified improperly as elements of interstate commerce. Therefore,
he reasoned, securities transactions could not be regulated Constitu-
tionally by the Federal government.
House and Senate discussions of the Act did not include considera-
tion of First Amendment Rights. The House accepted without objection
the assertion, made by Congressman Lea of California, that "When these
market exchanges are open for the investors of the Nation, the Govern-
ment has the right to expect that corporations whose stocks are listed
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there and offered to the public will give truthful information and
make a full revelation of the fact ..." [ Congressional Record
,
p. 8762] No one pointed out that the government's authority is limited
and that a government's alleged "right to expect" does not necessarily
imply a Constitutional right of government to prior restraint. In
fact, under the common law the right to know is not recognized except
in cases of fraud. [Posner, 1978, pp. 22 and 24-25] All 50 states
have laws against fraud and deceptive speech. "Untruthful speech,
commercial or otheirwise, has never been protected for its own sake."
[Virginia State Board of Pharmacy V. Citizens Consumer Council, p. 771]
In the "crisis" psychology surrounding the SEC's origin [see
Mackey and Reid, pp. 10-12 and 17-19], no attempt was made during the
Senate hearings or in the discussion held by the House and the Senate
to determine whether FADS might be regarded as a proper constituent of
the market for ideas by virtue of the information provided. Reference
was almost exclusively to:
"... a national public interest which makes it
necessary to . . . require appropriate reports
. . . in order to protect interstate commerce, the
national credit, the Federal taxing power, to pro-
tect and make more effective the national banking
system and the Federal Reserve System, and to
insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets
in such [securities] transactions." Security
Exchange Act of 1934, section 2; [ Congressional
Record
,
p. 881]
Perhaps because everyone accepted the (arbitrary) exclusion of
"commercial" speech from First Amendment protection, no one dreamed in
those "crisis" times of raising the issue of whether FADS are protected.
There was no reference at all to:
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"... a national public interset which makes it
necessary to protect and defend the First Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution."
Recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court suggest that oversight
should be corrected.
3^
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IV. The First Amendment and Commercial Speech
The First Amendment to the Constitution guarantees freedom of
speech and of the press. It clearly prohibits the government from
interfering with or regulating the market for ideas. At least six
general motivations for seeking freedom of speech have been identi-
fied. [Owen, 1975, p. 6] They are:
(1) a simple reaction to the oppression of government control;
(2) a means of guaranteeing that truth will emerge from diver-
sity, with an opportunity for the adherents of alternatives
to prove in practice the validity of their own ideas;
(3) a safety valve for dissenting groups;
(4) a check on the power of government;
(5) a means of producing an informed and alert citizenry;
(6) a valuable end in itself.
We believe all six reasons are relevant to the issues of SEC regu-
lating FADS.
The status of commercial speech relative to the First Amendment
protection from government restraint "abridging the freedom of speech"
has been changing. Recent court decisions "do not define the outer
bounds of the applicability of the First Amendment to advertising but
merely mark a stage in a gradual expansion of the kinds of commercial
speech which will be brought within the protection of the First Amend-
ment by the courts." [Coase, pp. 31-2]
Less than 40 years ago, on ground that all commercial speech fell
outside First Amendment protection, the Supreme Court dismissed claims
that local ordinances prohibiting (1) the distribution of advertising
handbills [Vallentine v. Christensen, 1942] and (2) door-to-door soli-
citation of magazine subscriptions [Breard v. Alexandria, 1951] were
unconstitutional. However, the rationale for and the scope of those
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decisions were not made clear. Apparently speech which "did no more
than propose a commercial transaction" was thought to be less deserving
of protection than speech of a political, religious, or cultural nature.
But the Supreme Court did not specify what criteria (e.g., speaker,
circumstance, time, form, content) were to be used to identify commer-
cial speech.
Since then, books [Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 1963] and motion pic-
tures [Freedman v. Maryland, 1965] produced to make money were not
disqualified from First Amendment protection. The form of communica-
tion was considered not to be an appropriate basis for discrimination.
[New York Times v. Sullivan, 1964]
In 1973, in response to a newspaper's contention that the distinc-
tion between commercial and other speech should be eliminated, the
Supreme Court said: "Any First Amendment interest which might be
served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which might
arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting the regulation
[of discrimination in employment] is altogether absent when the com-
mercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising
is incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity." [Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Committee on Human Relations, 1973, emphasis
added.] But at least one scholar reads the First Amendment as protec-
ting even "speech which aids illegal conduct." [Countryman, p. 41.]
In 1975 the Supreme Court appeared to suggest that a balancing of
interests might be appropriate in commercial speech cases, with adver-
tising enjoying a degree of First Amendment protection. [Bigelow v.
Virginia, 1975] However, the Court did not need to decide in that
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case either (1) the extent to which the First Amendment permits adver-
tising related to activities the State may regulate or prohibit, or
(2) the extent to which constitutional protection is afforded commer-
cial speech under all circumstances and all kinds of regulation.
In 1976, the Supreme Court held explicitly that a purely commer-
cial advertisement was entitled to some First Amendment protection
because an advertiser's purely economic interest was not adequate
grounds for disqualifying him . [Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 1976] The Court rested its deci-
sion on "the consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial infor-
mation [which] may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest
in the day's most urgent political debate." It went on to state:
"Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it
sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination
of information as to who is producing and selling
what, for what reason, and at what price. So long
as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise
economy, the allocation of our resources in large
measure will be made through numerous private
economic decisions. It is in the public interest
that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intel-
ligent and well informed. To this end the free
flow of commercial information is indispensable."
[Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 1976, p. 1827]
The Court thus argued that the fundamental reason for freedom of
speech is the people's right to know, and that the First Amendment
assures freedom to the reader and listener as well as writer and
speaker. The Court indicated that a balanced regulation of some forms
of commercial speech was legitimate, for example: prohibition of
false or misleading statements, advertisements of illegal transactions,
and restrictions on the time, place and manner of communications.
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In 1977 the Supreme Court seemed to suggest that the propriety of
restrictions must be judged by taking into account available communi-
cation alternatives. An ordinance prohibiting the posting of "For
Sale" signs in front of houses could not be regarded simply as a re-
striction on time, place or manner of advertising, since other channels
of communication were less effective or more costly, and therefore not
adequate alternatives. [Linmark Associates v. Township of Willingboro,
1977]
Later in 1977 the Supreme Court stated that it would be "peculiar"
to deny the consumer, on the ground that information is incomplete, at
least some of the information that is relevant to reach an informed
decision. Such an "argument assumes the public is not sophisticated
enough to realize the limitations of advertising, and that the public
is better kept in ignorance than trusted with correct but incomplete
information. We suspect that the argument rests on an underestimate
of the public." [Bates v. State Bar, 1977] The Court also restated
its position on the kinds of commercial speech regulation that would
be permissable. Because advertisements are planned in advance, re-
quirements for truthfulness would not be inappropriate in advertising
complicated services.
"For example, advertising claims as to the quality
of service . . . are not susceptible to measurement
or verification; accordingly such claims may be so
likely to mislead as to warrant restriction ... We
do not foreclose the possibility that some. . .warning
or disclaimer or the like, might be required. . .to
assure that the consumer is not misled." [Bates v.
State Bar, 1977, p. 2709]
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But "the determination by a government agency that a statement is
false is completely alien to the doctrine of free speech and of
freedom of the press." [Coase, p. 27] It seems likely that the law
will be interpreted to allow . . . somewhat diminished powers for the
various government agencies which regulate advertising." [Coase, p. 33]
(For a less sanguine view of Court action in three cases since Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, see Liebeler [1979] and Berns [1979].)
If corporate FAD reports to the public are seen to be commercial
speech advertising the firm managers and firm products (including
various risk/ return equity claims); and if the SEC is interpreted to
be a government agency regulating commercial speech, then the issue
of First Amendment protection to the speaker and writer does become
relevant to the relations between corporate managers and public audi-
tors; and also between them and the government.
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V. Commercial Speech and the SEC
An important type of property today is intangibles, made up
largely of promises: contract performance rights, government bene-
fits, and corporate stockholdings. Investors surely list their shares
among their assets. We reason that FADS constitute a complex adver-
3
tisement by the corporation of at least four components: corporate
equities for investors, corporate goods for customers, corporate suc-
cess for creditors and employees, and corporate management for managers.
Although this view is unorthodox, it does have support.
In the literature of accounting, economics and finance, securities
are regarded as products combining elements of risk and return, condi-
tional claims to future consumption. Various forms of stocks, bonds,
and debt contracts provide the opportunity for (expected) satisfaction
contingent upon future states and actions. In these respects, securi-
ties are similar to many consumer durables. Furthermore, like tangible
assets, securities are bought and sold in markets. Thus FADS may be
interpreted as advertisements relating to the risk, return, and other
financial characteristics of interest to both current and future cus-
tomers for corporate equities.
We also reason that FADS are representations by managers to inter-
ested parties concerning the nature and quality of their performance
in conducting business operations. If management services are commer-
cial services provided by one association (corporate officials) to
another (the investors) at a price established in an economic market
[Alchian and Demsetz, p. ], then FADS are attempts to influence the
market price of those services; and therefore, FADS are advertising.
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If either of these arguments is accepted as valid, then a neces-
sary implication is that First Amendment protections available to com-
mercial speech for limiting the power of government to regulate speech
are available for corporate FADS. Thus the assumption that government
may validly mandate prior restraint and public disclosure may be false,
and SEC regulation of FADS may be unconstitutional.
Recent Supreme Court decisions about commercial speech have
reversed the traditional assumption, and, through legal reasoning by
analogy, are placing the burden of the SEC to justify its restrictions
on communication. That justification cannot be based on a presumption
that the investor lacks the sophistication to interpret those state-
ments or to make appropriate use of the incomplete information they
contain. It would be difficult Constitutionally to uphold any restric-
tion which deprived investors of information enabling them to compare
security alternatives. [Virginia Pharmacy, 1976; and Bates, 1977]
Though there are significant Constitutional barriers to SEC
restrictions on corporate FADS, the First Amendment imm not totally
preclude the possibility that SEC might legitimately require FADS to
contain or exclude certain classes of information. False or mis-
leading statements may be subject to regulation [Virginia Pharmacy,
1976; and Bates, 1977.] But the burden of the proof under the First
Amendment should still rest on the SEC to show that a particular
speech or publication contained information that was in fact false or
misleading. The SEC may regulate the time, place or manner of FAD
communication. For that regulation to accord with the First Amendment,
the SEC must be able to show that adequate alternatives are available
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which are relatively equivalent in cost and efficiency. [Linmark
Associates v. Township of Willingboro, 1977]
But if "adequate alternatives" are indeed available, then
—
Catch 22!—why the necessity to regulate FADS?
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VI. Sunmary and Prospect
Conflict between parties claiming different Constitutional pre-
rogatives are unavoidable. Some speech may unjustly impair other
valued behavior, and tradeoffs are inevitable. Though the First
Amendment does not permit prior restraints, it does not protect state-
ments of slander, libel, fraud, obscenity, copyright infringement,
loud disturbance, invasion of privacy, and danger to national security.
[See Berns, pp. 3-4; and court cases such as: Gertz v. Welch, 1974;
Ginsberg v. New York, 1968; Miller v. California, 1973; Saia v.
New York, 1948; Kovacs v. Cooper, 1949; Smith v. Dravo Corp., 1953;
and Greer v. Spock, 1976.]
"The question in every case is whether the words are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a_ clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent." [Schenck v. United States, 1919, pp. 51-52,
emphasis added] First Amendment considerations become particularly
crucial in deciding whether the empirical evidence that "market fail-
ure" and "externalities" due to accounting speech not otherwise pro-
scribed warrents blanket restrictions on FADS.
Cost/benefit balancing will be attempted by the Court whether
piecemeal or, hopefully, with some underlying theory for consistency.
Moore [1969] made a start toward such a theory with his economic ana-
lysis of the concept of freedom and applied it to each item in the
Bill of Rights. While not citing Moore, Liebeler [1979, pp. 20-44]
presented an economic theory of free speech. Regardless of how much
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weight the Court will explicitly give to economic arguments, the funda-
mental Constitutional question is this:
Shall the United States Government, with its author-
ity to regulate commerce, use its power to impose
decisions made by expanding bureaucracies; or, with
its duty to protect free speech, use its power to
prevent restrictions of the free flow of ideas by
either government agency or private association?
In its past decisions, the Court has demonstrated a consistent
willingness to strike down as unlawful abridgment of the First Amend-
ment any regulatory measures which constitute "prior administrative
restraints" on free speech. "Above all else, the First Amendment means
that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content... The essence
of the forbidden censorship is content control." [Police Department
of Chicago v. Mosley, 1972, pp. 95-96] In light of the Court asser-
tion that the government "thus carries a heavy burden of showing
justification for the enforcement of such a restraint," [Organization
for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 1971] the SEC should be required to show
that the prior restraint on FADS represented by its censorship regula-
tions is a warranted limitation on commercial speech because of the
greater benefit actually provided or greater harm actually avoided
when compared to the expectation of what otherwise would have occurred.
Mandated uniformity, by damming the free flow of information, not only
does not assure clean flow, but also may make the overflow muddier
than ever.
We do need the Supreme Court to decide (1) the extent to which the
First Amendment permits advertising in relation to regulated or pro-
hibited activities and thereby permits corporate management freely to
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choose among FADS; and (2) the extent to which the First Amendment
protects commercial speech under all circumstances and all kinds of
regulation. But the courts do not act on their own initiative. Under
the Constitution, protection must be applied for through action after
the fact of alleged injury, past or prospective.
We might be able to expect some amelioration without litigation if
the SEC Commissioners and Staff were to become convinced that prior
restraint of FADS is unconstitutional. Among the past actions of the
SEC that seem to constitute prior restraint in violation of First
Amendment protection are the following: cash flows, current values,
forecasts, sinking fund depreciation, direct cost of inventories,
estimated quantities of natural resource reserves, pro forma statements
with estimates of savings from mergers, and all non-GAAP accounting.
Even if all hints of prior restraint were eliminated so that cor-
porations could disclose as they wish any data in addition to mandated
uniform reports, regulators would still be in the business of making
and selling regulations—spending public funds in the "public interest.'
In the aftermath of the Virginia Pharmacy, Bates, and Bellotti cases,
litigation is still probably necessary and desirable to control the
overreaching of the regulators who can be expected systematically to
underestimate the total costs and exaggerate the benefits of their
actions.
We are still in need of a corporation willing to finance an ex-
pensive case to test whether FADS, as commercial speech, have First
Amendment protection.
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Footnotes
Elliott and Schuetze [1979] posed in a negative way one kind of
objection to that prevalent assumption. In a priority of five pre-
requisites for adopting federal regulation, they listed last the issue
of whether the "regulatory remedy is in violation of laws of constitu-
tional rights" [pp. 10-13]. In their presentation, four other criteria
were more important: the extent of social damage, the frequency of
undesirable behavior, the existence of alternative private sector
remedy, and the effectiveness of the governmental regulatory solution.
In Table 2 [p. 11] they presented 12 "pre-regulatory situations" to
illustrate the sequential application of their priorities. They iden-
tified only one situation, "companies use non-uniform financial
reporting standards," for which the regulatory remedy (SEC control) is
in violation of laws or constitutional rights and for which, they say,
a private remedy (FASB) is available [pp. 12-13].
They did not address in a positive way the Constitutional issue
raised in this paper, which is the question whether non-uniform
accounting is protected as commercial speech under the First Amend-
ment. More importantly, they did not discuss the probability that
if FADS are protected, then prior restraint is unconstitutional
whether attempted by the SEC, the FASB, the AICPA, or state agencies.
2
Our research effots to identify those Supreme Court decisions
relevant to the issues we wished to consider were facilitated by our
access to the LEXIS system. LEXIS, a computer based, key work search,
visual display system enabled us to scan the large volume of Court
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decisions and to identify, quickly, those that were of particular
interest.
The following is one example of sequential search actually con-
ducted using LEXIS:
Sequential Number
Level Key Words of Cases
1 Securities Exchange Act OR 461
Securities and Exchange Commission
2 ... AND First Amendment OR
Fourth Amendment 23
3 ... BUT NOT Fourth Amendment 19
Since LEXIS contains a full text of all the decisions, it provides
immediate access to all or any of the bases identified at each level
of key work screening. Our total search, and cases actually used in
our study, went beyond LEXIS to include both (1) recent decisions that
have not been placed in the system, and (2) cases prior to 1938, the
earliest date for cases in LEXIS.
3
For one example see the special edition of Gulf & Western's 1978
Annual Report that was published as a 64-page advertising section (43%)
of Time magazine, February 5, 1979, (150 pages total). The financial
statements in the labeled advertisement were audited by Ernst & Ernst.
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